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JURISDICTION
As a basis for his appeal, plaintiff relies on Utah Code
Ann,, §78-2-2(3) (amended 1988), and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court,

PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff-Appellant, Hugh Schurtz ("Schurtz"), has appealed
from a final order and judgment rendered by the Honorable Frank
G. Noel, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County.

On appeal, Schurtz claims that the trial

court's grant of partial summary judgment against him on the
issue of incidental and consequential damages was a clear error
of lawe

Schurtz further claims that the trial court erred or

abused its discretion by failing to award all of his costs of
court and attorney's fees.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

In his brief on appeal, Schurtz identifies three issues for
decision by the Supreme Court:

1

Issue I

Did the trial court err in granting BMW's motion
for partial

summary judgment on Schurtz's claim for

incidental and consequential damages?

Issue II

Did the trial court make findings sufficient to
support its decision to award Schurtz less than his
full claim for attorneyfs fees?

Issue III

Did
presented

the
at

preponderance
trial

support

of

credible

evidence

the court's decision

to

discount the attorney's fees award?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES

Plaintiff

claims

in his brief that this appeal

matters of first impression for the court.

2

involves

A.

United States Code,

Plaintiff requests the court

to interpret 15 U.S.C. §2301 et seq., commonly known
as the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act.

(A complete copy

is included in the Appendix).

B.

Utah Code Annotated,

Plaintiff requests the court

to interpret Utah Code Ann., §70A-2-719 as it affects
new car

limited warranties under the

Magnusson-Moss

Act.
1.

70A-2-316(4)

Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter on liquidation or
limitation of damages and on contractual modification of
remedy.
2.

70A-2-719e
remedy.

(1)

Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of
this section and of the preceding section on
liquidation and limitation of damages,

(2)

Contractual modification or limitation of

(a)

the agreement may provide for remedies in addition
to or in substitution for those provided in this
chapter and may limit or alter the measure of
damages recoverable under this chapter, as by
limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the
goods and repayment of the price or to repair and
replacement of nonconforming goods or parts; and

(b)

resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless
the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in
which case it is the sole remedy.

Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited
remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be
had as provided in this act.

3

(3)

Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless
the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.
Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss
is commercial is not.

C.

The

following

provision

of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure is determinative of the issues on appeal:
1. Rule 52(a)
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the
facts specially and state separately in its conclusions
of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant
to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the
findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action.
Requests for
findings are not necessary for purposes of review.
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered
as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated
orally and recorded in open court following the close
of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum
of decision filed by the court. The trial court need
not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b).
The court shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.

4

D.

The following provision of the Utah Code of Judicial

Administration is determinative of the issues on appeal:

1.

Rule 4-501(5)

The points and authorities in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section
that contains a concise statement of material facts as
to which the party contends a genuine issue exists.
Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall refer with particularity to those
portions of the record upon which the opposing party
relies, and, if applicable, shall state
the numbered
sentence or sentences of the movantfs facts that are
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's
statement shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by
the opposing partyfs statement.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature Of The Case»
This action arose out of Schurtz! s purchase of a BMW model

320i Automobile ("Automobile").

The complaint alleged various

causes of action under a limited warranty against BMW as the
manufacturer of the Automobile and the BMW dealers.

In his

complaint, Schurtz alleged that the Automobile was defective when
sold.

He further claimed that BMW and the BMW dealers failed to

correct certain purported defects under the terms of the warranty
issued by BMW, notwithstanding his refusal to allow the BMW
dealers to complete certain repairs and after several offers by
BMW to replace the Automobile. (Record at 1-3).
5

The complaint

alleged six separate and distinct causes of action (Record at 310) all arising out of the same basic facts:

1.

The Automobile

was sold

with

a

limited

warranty

against defects in materials and workmanship;

2.

Schurtz brought the Automobile in for repairs numerous

times over a period of a year and a half and had extensive
contacts with BMW and the BMW dealers during that period in
efforts to correct the claimed defects; and

3.

BMW and the BMW dealers allegedly failed to correct the

alleged defects.

The complaint was based on legal theories of breach of
express and implied warranties under the Magnusson-Moss Warranty
Act

("Magnusson-Moss") ,

the Utah

Uniform

Commercial

Code

("U.C.C.11) and negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation, in
violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. (Record at 310) .

Schurtz claimed damages, including the purchase price of

the Automobile, incidental and consequential damages for costs
and expenses allegedly

incurred

in his efforts to have the

defects corrected, attorney's fees, costs and punitive damages.
(Record at 10 and 11).

6

B.

Disposition In The District Court.

Based on a motion

for partial

summary judgment filed by

BMW, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the defendants
before

trial,

Schurtzfs

dismissing

claims

for

negligent

and

intentional misrepresentation, (Fourth Cause of Action) breach of
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (Fifth Cause of Action) and
for punitive damages on all claims. (Record at 423-425).

After

the first day of trial and following Schurtz's testimony, the
trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of BMW on
the issue of incidental and consequential damages.
1182).

(Record at

The parties later stipulated that BMW would allow Schurtz

to return the Automobile and refund the purchase price minus a
credit to BMW for actual use. (Record at 1182) .

It was also

stipulated that for purposes of the claim for attorney's fees,
that Schurtz would be deemed to be the prevailing party. (Record
at 1183;

Transcript at 110).

The trial court received testimony and other evidence on the
amount of the attorney's fees claimed by Schurtz and took the
matter under advisement.

In a minute entry dated August 9, 1988,

Judge Noel awarded Schurtz the sum of $10,000 as attorney's fees,
on the basis that the evidence established that "... this case
could have and probably should have been settled very early in
the proceedings

for an amount roughly

outcome." (Record at 1141).

equal

to the ultimate

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions
7

of Law state that the trial court was not persuaded to award
Schurtz the full amount of attorney's fees he claimed and made a
substantial discount to an amount determined to be reasonable
under the circumstances. (Record at 1179).

FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW,
1.

The claims raised in the trial court proceeding were

first made in a complaint (Civil No. C84-0073W)

filed by Schurtz

in the United States District Court for the District of Utah.
That action was dismissed on June 15, 1984, after a motion to
dismiss was filed by BMW challenging the court's jurisdiction on
the basis that the complaint did not allege damages sufficient to
meet the jurisdictional threshold, excluding punitive damages.
(Transcript at 128).

2.

Following

the dismissal

of the action

filed

in the

United States District Court, a complaint (Civil No. C84-7463)
was filed in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County on or about December 18, 1984. (Record at 2 ) .

3.

An order to show cause was subsequently issued by the

trial court requiring the parties to appear and show cause why
the

case

should

not be

dismissed

for

failure

to

prosecute.

(Record at 50) . An order of dismissal was entered on July 21,
1986 due to the plaintifffs failure to appear.
8

(Record at 51,

Transcript at 144). The order of dismissal was subsequently set
aside on the basis of excusable neglect following a hearing on
October 6, 1986.

4c

(Record at 58).

John Baird, Mr. Schurtz's counsel, incurred time in

setting aside the order of dismissal.

5.

Sometime

(Transcript at 144).

after the dismissal

of the federal court

action or immediately following the filing of the complaint in
state court, but prior to the filing of an answer, counsel for
BMW

contacted

Schurtz's

counsel

to

discuss

settlement.

(Transcript at 128) .

6.

The settlement discussions included Schurtzfs claims

for expenses associated with purchasing the Automobile, the costs
incurred following the purchase, his attorney's fees and costs.
(Transcript at 130).

7.

BMW made

a specific

offer of settlement based on

rescission. (Transcript at 130).

The offer was confirmed in

correspondence dated August 22, 1986, but rescission may have
been discussed earlier. (Transcript at 131).

8.

John Bairdfs billing records disclosed that settlement

was discussed by the parties on the following dates: January 23,
1985, January 24, 1985 (Transcript at 131); March 3, 1986, July
9

29,

1986, August

18, 1986,

(Transcript at 132); September 9,

1986, February 18, 1987 (Transcript at 133).

9.
and

In a letter dated February 18, 1987, the specific terms

conditions

of

a

settlement

were

outlined

by

Mr.

Baird.

(Transcript at 137) . The letter contained a signature line for
acknowledgment by counsel for the named defendants. (Transcript
at 140).

The letter later became the subject of a motion to

enforce settlement. (Transcript at 140).

The motion was denied

following a hearing on April 23, 1987.

10.

Mr. Baird continued to log time after the February,

1987 settlement letter. (Transcript at 140).

11.

Mr.

Baird

withdrew

as

Schurtz's

counsel

of

record

following the failure of the settlement and subsequently filed an
attorney's lien in the sum of $23,273.04.

(Transcript at 161).

Mr. McPhie, Schurtz's present

counsel of record, entered

appearance

(Transcript at 163;

on April

3, 1987.

his

Record

at

496) .

12.

The complaint filed in state court alleged six separate

causes of action, including:

(1) Breach of the Magnusson-Moss

Act,

warranty,

(2)

warranty,
Consumer

Breach
(4)
Sales

of written

Negligent
Law,

representation,

(6) Breach
10

(3) Breach
(5)

of warranty

of

Breach

implied
of

Utah

under the U.C.C.

(Record at 3-10).

The complaint claimed punitive damages as well

as general, incidental and consequential damages. (Record at 10
and 11).

13.

Several causes of action were based on legal theories

of fraud and misrepresentation. (Transcript at 141).

Based upon

a motion for partial summary judgment filed by BMW, the trial
court entered an order dated February 17, 1987, dismissing the
fourth cause of action (negligent misrepresentation); The fifth
cause of action (claim under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices
Act) and all of Schurtz!s claims for punitive damages. (Record at
423-425; Transcript at 142).

14.

Notwithstanding

the

dismissal

of

the

claims

for

punitive damage, Schurtz continued to demand payment for damage
claims that had

not survived

the motion

for partial

summary

judgment and refused to settle. (Transcript at 142 and 143).

15.

During

the

time Mr.

Baird

represented

Mr. Schurtz,

several associates were reassigned to the case resulting in an
overlap

of efforts and

supervision.

(Transcript at 146). Mr.

Schurtzfs second attorney, David McPhie, was substituted for Mr.
Baird, after the hearing on the Motion to Compel Settlement but
prior to trial resulting in a duplication of efforts in reviewing
files, pleadings and work that had transpired.
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Mr. Schurtz was

billed for the time incurred by Mr. McPhie to acquaint himself
with the facts of the case. (Transcript at 166).

16.

Mr. McPhiefs billing

statements disclosed

settlement

negotiations with BMW on the following dates: September 2, 1987,
October 16, 1987, March 10, 1988 (Transcript at 167), and July 7,
1988 (Transcript at 169).

17.
Mr.

In all of the negotiations between the parties after

McPhie

entered

his appearance, Mr. Schurtz

attempted

to

solicit an offer from BMW in an amount substantially in excess of
a settlement based on rescission. (Transcript at 170).
to

"come

out on the case", Schurtz claimed

In order

entitlement to a

refund in the purchase price of the Automobile minus a credit for
mileage (revocation), incidental and consequential damages, costs
and

attorney's

claimed

fees.

(Transcript

at 173).

The total

amount

by Schurtz was "several multiples" of the rescission

figure. (Transcript at 174).

18.

The only express warranty

BMW's written Limited Warranty
Schurtz

when

he

purchased

at issue in this case is

("Warranty") which was given to
the

Automobile.

The

warranty

specifically provides:
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., HEREBY EXCLUDES INCIDENTAL
AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING LOSS OF TIME,
INCONVENIENCE OR LOSS OF USE OF THE VEHICLE, FOR ANY
BREACH OF ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY, INCLUDING
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, APPLICABLE TO
THIS PRODUCT. (Warranty at 1; Plaintiff's Exhibit P3).
12

19.
warranty

The Warranty

is a limited

which provides

in part:

"repair or replace" type
"the dealer will, without

charge for parts or labor either repair or replace said part(s)
being wholly the responsibility of BMW of North America, Inc."
(Warranty at 1;

20.

Plaintiff's Exhibit P-3).

Schurtz received the Warranty and read it before he

purchased the Automobile.

(Transcript at 8).

He understood that

the Warranty was limited to repair or replacement. (Transcript
at 9) .

21.

A BMW representative told Schurtz that BMW would repair

the Automobile, refund his money or replace the Automobile if it
could not be repaired.

(Transcript at 47) .

BMW made repeated

efforts to repair the Automobile but, Schurtz gave up, believing
that BMW could not make the necessary repairs. (Transcript at
23) .

22.

Following

the

first day

of trial and after hearing

Schurtzfs testimony regarding the Warranty and repairs made to
the Automobile, the trial court granted BMW's motion for partial
summary judgment on the claim for incidental and consequential
damages.

(Transcript

at

95) .

The

trial

court

found

that

Magnusson-Moss and the U.C.C. allowed the parties to contract and
limit the remedies available under the Warranty.
94) .
13

(Transcript at

23.

The parties stipulated at trial that for the limited

purpose of determining the issue of attorneys fees, Schurtz would
be deemed to be the prevailing party. (Transcript at 110;
at 1183).

The trial court received testimony and evidence on the

amount claimed by Schurtz as attorneys fees.
dated

Record

August

In a minute entry

9, 1988, Judge Noel awarded Schurtz the sum of

$10,000 as attorney f s fees on the basis that ". . . this case
could have and probably should have been settled very early in
the proceedings
outcome."

for an amount

(Record at 1141).

roughly

equal

to the

ultimate

The minute entry on the issue of

attorney's fees was included in finding number four of the trial
court's

Findings

of Fact and

Conclusions

of Law.

(Record

at

1176) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Issue I
Schurtz
purchased

was

provided

the Automobile.

with

a

Warranty

The Warranty

at

the

specifically

time

he

excluded

incidental and consequential damages in bold type on its face.
The

exclusion

of

incidental

and

consequential

damages

is

a

separate and independent part of the Warranty and must be viewed
apart from the limited Warranty to repair or replace.

The trial

court did not err in dismissing Schurtzf s claim for incidental
and consequential damages.
14

Issue II
The issue of the amount of attorney's fees is discretionary
with the trial court and is subject to certain conditions and
limitations.

The trial court received testimony and evidence

regarding the amount of the attorney's fees claimed by Schurtz.
In his brief, Schurtz challenges the adequacy of the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law claiming they are insufficient and
lacking in detail.

Schurtz's challenge of the court's Findings

and Conclusions is insubstantial, however, for the reason that
his counsel prepared them and any alleged inadequacy should be
construed against Schurtz.

The evidence in the record supports

the trial court's decision on the amount of attorney's fees.

Issue III
Testimony and evidence was introduced in the trial court
establishing a duplication of efforts and an overall inefficiency
in the prosecution of the case.

Schurtz's claim for attorney's

fees included the actual amount of time spent on the case by both
of his attorneys, including:
1.

Charges associated with the filing of an action in

federal court which was voluntarily dismissed due to a
failure to plead claims in an amount sufficient to meet the
jurisdictional threshold;
2.

Fees associated with reinstating the state court action

which was dismissed for failure to prosecute;
15

3.

Fees

incurred

in

prosecuting

claims

which

were

dismissed at various stages of the proceedings by the trial
court.
4.

Fees arising out of a dispute over a failed settlement

agreement.
5.

Fees incurred by the substitution of counsel resulting

in the duplication of efforts.
6.

Fees

incurred

in attempting

to negotiate

an

amount

exceeding a rescission based settlement.
The record contains ample testimony and evidence to support the
trial court's ruling that the case could have and should have
been settled in an amount roughly equal to the ultimate outcome.
The

record

does

not

contain

any

evidence

of

an

abuse

of

discretion in the trial court's award of attorney's fees in an
amount less than that claimed by Schurtz.

ARGUMENT

Issue I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING BMW'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENYING SCHURTZf S CLAIM FOR
INCIDENTAL AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.

At trial, Schurtz testified that his major dissatisfaction
with

the

discovered

Automobile
several

was

problems

that,
which
16

following
were

not

its

purchase,

corrected

to

he
his

satisfaction after several visits to the BMW Dealers.

Based on

his own testimony, his Complaint was simply one for breach of
warranty.

A.

The Record Supports The Trial Court's Ruling>

Following the first day of trial and after hearing Schurtz's
testimony, Judge Noel granted BMW's motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of incidental and consequential damages.
Judge Noel ruled, as a matter of law, that Magnusson-Moss and the
U.C.C. allowed the parties to enter into a contract limiting the
remedies

available

under

the Warranty.

(Transcript

at

94) .

Schurtz did not controvert the statement of facts set out in
BMW's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment,
(Record at 970 and 1142) as required by Rule 4-501(5) of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration and the material facts contained
in BMW's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the
Motion (Record at 778) were deemed to be admitted.

Furthermore,

the undisputed facts in the record were supported by Schurtz's
testimony at trial.

Schurtz testified that he was provided with a copy of the
Warranty before he purchased the Automobile, that he read the
Warranty and understood that it was a repair or replace type
Warranty.

(Transcript

capital letters:

at

9) •

The Warranty

states

in

large

"BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., HEREBY EXCLUDES
17

INCIDENTAL AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING LOSS OF TIME,
INCONVENIENCE OR LOSS OF USE OF THE VEHICLE, FOR ANY BREACH OF
ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF MERCHANTABILITY, APPLICABLE TO THIS PRODUCT."
is readily

apparent

on the

The exclusion

face of the Warranty

and

is not

"buried" in small type-faced boiler plate language.

Judge Noel explained the basis for his ruling dismissing the
claim for incidental and consequential damages as follows:
The parties in this case contracted. The court feels
that it would not include consequential or incidental
damages.
Counsel, you've made the argument that the
limited warranties provide for recovery of these in
their original purpose, that consequential and
incidental damages are allowed to come into play under
the U.C.C. Act. The court disagrees.
The purpose of
that provision is to provide a fair modicum of relief
in a breach of warranty claim, when the remedy provided
under the lemon law fails in its essential purpose.
And under the facts and circumstances of this case,
there would be a fair relief provided. (Transcript at
94) .
Judge Noel reasoned that the parties contracted to limit the
remedies provided under the Warranty to the repair or replacement
of the Automobile.

He found that the Warranty provided a fair

modicum of relief for the damages sustained and that it had not
failed in its essential purpose.
introduce
Warranty
Schurtz

any
failed

evidence
in

testified

to

Furthermore, Schurtz failed to

substantiate

its essential
that

prior

to

his

purpose.
filing

claim
To the

his

that

the

contrary,

complaint,

Mr.

Stansbury, a BMW representative, told him that BMW would refund
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his money or replace the Automobile if it could not be repaired.
(Transcript at 47) .

The

cases

cited

in

Schurtzfs

brief

on

the

issue of

incidental and consequential damages are distinguishable on the
facts because most, if not all of the cases, contain specific
findings of a failure in purpose.

Furthermore, several of the

cases are based on factual circumstances where dealers refused to
make repairs.

The authorities relied on by Schurtz do not apply

under the facts before this Court on appeal.

B.

The Law Supports The Trial Court's Ruling,

The right of contracting parties to determine and fix the
only obligations in warranties by which they are bound has been
held, in the absence of express statutory authority, to authorize
contractual stipulations negativing those warranties which would
arise by implication of law.

Annot., 54 ALR 3d 1219, 1220.

Furthermore, disclaimer of warranty clauses are authorized under
Article 2 of the U.C.C.

The Utah Legislature's adoption of the

U.C.C incorporated the ability to exclude or modify coverage
under warranties.

Utah Code Ann., § 70A-2-316(4) states "remedies for breach
of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provisions of
19

this

chapter

on

liquidation

or limitation

contractual modification of remedy."

of damages

and

on

An agreement may provide

for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided
by the U.C.C. and may

limit or alter the measure of damages

recoverable by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the
goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replcicement of
non-conforming goods or parts.
specifically
consequential
Even

allows

the

limitation

damages unless the exclusion

Magnusson-Moss

consequential

for

Utah Code Ann., § 70A-2-719 (3)

allows

damages

for

a

warrantor

breach

of

exclusion

of

is unconscionable.

to

any

or

exclude

written

or

or

limit

implied

warranty so long as the exclusion or limitation is conspicuous on
the face of the warranty.

15 USC § 2304 (a) (3).

Schurtz did not claim at trial that the warranty limitation was
unconscionable.

Rather, he argued that the Warranty failed of

its essential purpose and, that he is entitled to consequential
damages.

In his brief on appeal Schurtz relies on the Magnusson-Moss
Act

and Utah Code Ann., § 70A-2-719(2).

719(2), as reflected

The purpose of § 70A-2-

in the Official Comments to the Uniform

Commercial Code, is to make available to an aggrieved party all
remedies provided for in our statutory scheme when the limited
remedy

provided

purpose.

for

in the

contract

fails

of

its

essential

Even assuming, arguendo, that the warranty failed its

essential purpose, he is not entitled to consequential damages.
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Subsection

(2) of § 70A-2-719 does provide that upon such a

failure, a plaintiff may have the other remedies as provided in
the U.C.C.

The exclusion of consequential damages, however, is a

separate and independent part of the warranty and is governed by
Subsection (3), not Subsection (2) of § 70A-2-719.

In his brief

Schurtz requests this Court to interpret the provisions of the
Magnusson-Moss

Act.

In

interpreting

the

Act, however,

this

Court must be guided by the federal court's interpretations of
the Act, In Chatlos Svs., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp.,
635 F. 2d 1081, 1086-87 (3rd Cir. 1980), the Third Circuit Court
of

Appeals

analyzed

the

issue

of

consequential

damages

follows:
"It appears to us that the better reasoned
approach is to treat the consequential damage
disclaimer as an independent provision, valid unless
unconscionable.
This poses no logical difficulties.
A breach of contract may well contain no limitation on
breach of warranty damages but specifically exclude
consequential damages.
Conversely, it is quite
conceivable that some limitation might be placed on a
breach of warranty award, but consequential damages
would expressly be permitted.
The limited remedy of repair and consequential
damages exclusion are two discrete ways of attempting
to limit recovery for breach of warranty. . . .
The Code, moreover, tests each by a different
standard. The former survives unless it fails of its
essential purpose, while the latter is valid unless it
is unconscionable. We therefore see no reason to hold,
as a general proposition, that the failure of the
limited remedy provided in the contract without more,
invalidates a wholly distinct term in the agreement
excluding consequential damages.
The two are not
mutually exclusive.
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as

The testimony and evidence propounded in the trial court and
Judge Noel's ruling establish that the Warranty did not fail in
its essential purpose.

In Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc. 265

N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1978) and Goddard v. General Motors Corporation,
396 N.W.2d

761

(Ohio 1979), the principal cases relied on by

Schurtz on the issue of incidental and consequential damages, the
warranties were found to have failed in their purpose and only
then were the plaintiffs allowed to invoke remedies under the
Uniform

Commercial

Automobile

when

dealerships.

it

Code.
was

Here,
delivered

BMW
to

made
one

of

Pratt

the

to

the

defendant

Schurtz believed, however that BMW could not repair

the Automobile despite its repeated offers.
In

repairs

v.

Winnebago

Industries,

(Transcript at 23) .

Inc.

463

F.Supp.

709

(W.D.Penn., 1979), a case specifically dealing with a warranty
for a motor vehicle under Magnusson-Moss, the court found that
the purchasers of a mobile home were not entitled to rescission
under

Magnusson-Moss

because

the

dealer

did

not

have

the

opportunity to make a reasonable number of attempts to repair the
vehicle.

At

trial,

Schurtz

did

not

dispute

the

limited

remedy

provided by the Warranty nor did he allege that the limitation
was unconscionable.

Furthermore, he failed to introduce any

evidence sufficient to prove that the Warranty
essential purpose.

failed in its

The authorities cited above establish that

the exclusion of incidental and consequential damages must be
22

viewed

independently

from

the

limited

warranty

of

repair

or

replacement and Schurtz's claim of a failure of essential purpose
is irrelevant and immaterial as a matter of law.

The trial court

did not, therefore, err in denying Schultz's claim for incidental
and consequential damages.

Issue II

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
ITS DECISION TO AWARD SCHURTZ LESS THAN HIS FULL CLAIM
FOR ATTORNEYS FEES.

In his brief on appeal, Schurtz challenges the sufficiency
of the Findings of Fact entered by Judge Noel in support of his
decision to award attorney f s fees in an amount less than that
claimed

by

Schurtz.

It

must

be

noted

that

the

parties

stipulated that Schurtz was the prevailing party only for the
limited

purpose

of

(Transcript at 110;

deciding

the

issue

Record at 1183).

of

attorneyfs

fees.

As the prevailing party,

Mr. McPhie, Schurtz's counsel prepared the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

It is within the trial court's discretion to

adopt the Findings as submitted by the prevailing party, as long
as the Findings are not clearly contrary to the evidence. Boyer
Co. v. Lianell 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977).

Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets a high
standard of review for a challenge to Findings of Fact.
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The Rule

provides that Findings of Fact shall not be set aside unless
"clearly

erroneous."

Under

this

standard

of

review,

an

appellate court can set aside the factual findings of a trial
court only if they are clearly erroneous. Barker v. Francis 741
P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987).

The evidence and testimony elicited at trial on the amount
of attorney's fees established an inefficiency in the prosecution
of

the

case,

a

duplication

of

efforts,

assertion of claims previously dismissed.

and

the

continued

Judge Noel's Finding

number four that " . . . this case could have and probably should
have been settled very early in the proceedings for an amount
roughly

equal

to

the

outcome"

consistent with the evidence.

(Record

at

1141)

is

entirely

Findings of Fact will be set aside

only if they are clearly erroneous. They cannot be set aside if
there is a reasonable basis in evidence.

Gillmor v. Gillmor 745

P.2d 461 (Utah App., 1987).

Here
four.
seven

the

evidence

consistently

supports

Finding

number

The testimony on the attorney's fee issue covers eighty
pages

transcript.

(transcript

at

113)

of

the

two

hundred

page

A full seventeen pages of Schurtz's brief (pp. 23-

40) are devoted to a paraphrased summary of the testimony.

The

trial court heard the testimony of his attorneys and had the
ability to assess their credibility.

The trial court fulfilled

its responsibility to make a full inquiry into the amount of the
24

fees.

Assoc. Indus. Developments v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486 (Utah

1984).

On appeal, this Court should not substitute its judgment

for the trial court's assessment of the testimony.
v. Sidwell 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 26

(1989).

Monroe, Inc.

Schurtz's testimony

(Transcript at 47) and the testimony of John Baird (Transcript at
129 and 130) support Judge Noelfs Finding of Fact number four
(Record at 1179) that the case

".

. . could have been, and

probably should have been, settled very early in the proceedings,
for an amount roughly equal to the ultimate outcome."

Although

Findings should be made on all material subordinate and ultimate
factual

issues,

it

is not necessary

for the trial

court to

resolve all conflicting evidentiary issues and the court is not
required to negate allegations in its Findings of Fact.

Sorenson

v. Beers 614 P.2d 159 (Utah, 1980).

In essence, Schurtz argues that the trial court should have
believed his evidence rather than BMW's.
substantial
Findings
evidence

burden

of
in

Fact.
the

on

the party

Schurtz
record

has
that

Rule 52(a) imposes a

challenging
the burden
would

a trial

court's

to cite all the

support

Judge

Noel's

determination and then demonstrate why, even when viewed in the
light most favorable to the trial court, it is insufficient to
support the Finding under attack.

Harker v. Condominiums Forest

Glen, Inc. 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah App., 1987).

Only then can

this Court consider whether those Finds are clearly erroneous
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under Rule 52(a).

General Glass Corp. v. Mast Const. Co. 766

P.2d 429, 433 (Utah App. 1988).

Schurtz has not met his burden of proof because he has
failed

to demonstrate

erroneous based
trial.
courtf s
should

that Judge Noel's Findings are clearly

on the documentary

evidence and testimony

at

The clear weight of the evidence supports the trial
Findings
defer

on the attorneys

to

the

trial

fees

courtfs

issue and

advantaged

this

Court

position

in

evaluating the witnesses1 demeanor and credibility.

The trial

courtfs

light

Findings

should

not

be

disturbed

in

the

of

Schurtzfs failure to meet his burden on appeal.

Issue III

A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL
COURTfS DECISION TO DISCOUNT THE CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S
FEES.

Schurtz claimed attorney's fees for Mr. Baird, his prior
counsel,

together

counsel of record.
($44,069.15

with

the

fees

of Mr. McPhie, his

The total amount claimed for attorney's fees

at the time of trial) substantially

purchase price of the Automobile,
license fees.

present

exceeded

the

($14,500.00) plus taxes and

The disproportionate amount of the claim for fees

compared to the value of the Automobile, was a major impediment
to a settlement prior to the trial.
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The

issue

of

the

amount

of

attorneys

discretionary with the trial court and
conditions and limitations.
(Utah 1984) .
court

in

fees

awarded

is

is subject to certain

Travner v. Gushing, 688 P.2d 856

Among the factors to be considered by the trial

evaluating

a

claim

for

attorneys

relationship of the fee to the amount recovered,

fees

are:

the

the novelty and

difficulty of the issues involved;

the overall result achieved;

and, the necessity

a lawsuit to vindicate the

rights

of

the

of

contract.

Management, 645 P.2d
Cottrell

initiating

694 P. 2d

Turtle

Management,

Inc. v.

667, at 671 (Utah 1982).

622,

Haggis

In Cabrera v,

(Utah 1985) this court's most

recent

statement on the issue of the amount of attorneys fees, it relied
on

the

elements

contained

in

the

Code

of

Professional

Responsibility:
In determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees, a
trial judge may take into account the provision in the
Code of Professional Responsibility which specifies the
elements that should be considered
in setting
reasonable attorneys fees. Utah Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 2-106.
A Court may consider among
other factors, the difficulty of the litigation, the
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the
case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar services, the amount involved in the case and
the result attained, and the expertise and experience
of the attorneys involved. At 624-625.

The trial court received evidence regarding the attorneys
fees claimed by Schurtz, including the testimony of his counsel,
John

Baird

and

David McPhie.

Other
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evidence was

introduced

including time summaries and statements for fees and costs.

The

evidence, taken as a whole, established a duplication of efforts
and

an overall

inefficiency

in the prosecution

of the case.

Schurtzf s claim for fees included the actual amount of time spent
on all aspects of the case including:
(1)

charges associated with the filing of an action in

Federal

Court

which

was

voluntarily

dismissed

due

to

a

failure to plead claims in an amount sufficient to meet the
jurisdictional threshold;
(2)

fees associated with a state court action which was

dismissed for failure to prosecute;
(3)

fees arising out of a dispute over settlement.

(4)

fees tied to claims which were ultimately dismissed by

the trial court:
a.

Claim under Utah

Consumer Sales

Practices Act.

(Fifth Cause of Action).
b.

Claim

for

negligent

and

intentional

misrepresentation. (Fourth Cause of Action).
c.

Claim for punitive damages.

d.

Claim for incidental and consequential damages.

The limited relief granted by the trial court was based on
the stipulation of the parties to a rescission whereby Schurtz
agreed to return the automobile and BMW agreed to refund the
purchase price minus a credit to BMW for actual use.

All of the

other claims alleged in the complaint were disposed of by pre28

trial motions as outlined above.

The testimony and evidence show

that Schurtz continued to claim attorney's

fees for the time

spent in pursuing all of his alleged claims even after most of
those claims were dismissed.

An award of attorney's
prevailing issues.

fees is generally limited to the

In Barnes v. Wood 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah, 1988)

the Court of Appeals ruled that contractual liability for the
payment of attorneys fees extends only to the amount necessary
to enforce the contract.

The award of attorneys fees based on a

statute, was addressed in Graco Fishing v. Ironwood Exploration
766 P.2d 1074 (Utah 1988).

In Graco, this Court ruled that an

award of attorney's fees under the mechanic's lien statute must
be based on evidence which differentiates between the time spent
on successful claims and the time spent on unsuccessful claims.
The trial court's award of attorney's fees in an amount less than
the total claimed by Schurtz is consistent with a reduction in
fees to an amount consistent with the rescission based judgment.
In support of his claim for attorneys fees, Schurtz relies
on the case of Universal Motors, Inc. v. Waldock, 719 P.2d 254
(Alaska 1986).

A careful reading of that case reveals, however,

that it can be distinguished on the facts.

First and foremost,

the dealer and manufacturer (also BMW), refused to authorize any
repairs on a car under warranty.

Furthermore, the defendants in

that case refused to discuss settlement, despite several offers
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made by the plaintiff.

The Waldock case is distinguishable from

this case for the reasons that:
1.
BMW and the defendant dealers honored the warranty
and made repairs to the Automobile.
2.
BMW and the defendant dealers never refused to
negotiate settlement and, in fact, made several offers
to Schurtz.
3.
Schurtz never made an independent offer to scittle
the case in a fixed dollar amount or on specific terms
and conditions.

Schurtz also cites Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 578
F.2d 721 (1978) in support of his claim for the full amount of
his fees notwithstanding the disproportionate relationship of the
fees

to

the

value

of

the

Automobile.

The

Duval

case

is

distinguishable, however, for the reasons that it arose out of a
claim of odometer fraud and was brought under a federal statute
prohibiting the disconnection of odometers.

The case did not

arise under Magnusson-Moss or the Uniform Commercial Code.

Pre-trial

settlement

negotiations

may

be

considered

in

evaluating the claim for attorney's fees since Schurtz elected to
pay his attorneys to prosecute the case, including the punitive
damages

claim

which

was

subsequently

dismissed,

negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement.

rather

than

In the Waldock case,

the court considered the defendants refusal to attempt to settle
the case in evaluating an award of attorneys fees for the actual
amount of time spent on the case.
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Because

the

amount

of

attorneys

fees

awarded

is

discretionary, the standard of review is limited to whether the
award of attorneys fees is supported by evidence in the record.
Associated Indus. Developments v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah
1984) .

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared

after the date of the Minute Entry are supported by extensive
evidence

and

testimony

substantiating

the

trial

court's

determination that the case should have been settled in an amount
roughly equal to the ultimate outcome.

In Dixie State Bank v.

Bracken 94 Utah Adv. Rep.3 (1988) the Court of Appeals deferred
to the discretion of the trial court and found that a trial
court is allowed to reduce the amount asserted by one party in
determining a reasonable fee.

The record does not contain any

evidence of an abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of
attorneys fees in an amount less than that claimed by Schurtz.

CONCLUSION

The final Order and Judgment rendered by Judge Noel are
proper and should be affirmed.

The trial court did not err in

granting BMW's motion for partial summary judgment on the claim
for incidental and consequential damages.
motion

is

supported

by

substantial

The order granting the
credible

evidence

and

testimony in the record and the law supports the ruling.

The

trial court's Findings are adequate and sufficient to support the
decision to award Schurtz less than the full amount of his claim
31

for attorney's

fees.

The clear weight of the testimony

and

evidence in the record supports the Findings and they should not
be disturbed on appeal.

Finally, a preponderance of the credible

testimony and evidence in the record supports the trial court's
decision to discount the claim for attorney's fees.

For the reasons set forth herein, BMW respectfully requests
this Court to affirm the judgment rendered by Judge Noel in the
District Court.

DATED this ^

day of May,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Respondent's Brief were served by mailing, U.S. Mails,
postage prepaid, on this // day of May, 1989 to the following:
David A. McPhie, Esq.,
BLAKESLEY, PALMER & McPHIE
3450 Highland Drive, #301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Pamela J. Mah'd'ffey
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15 U.S.C. § 2301

§ 2301.

Definitions

For the purposes of this chapter:
(1) The term ''consumer product" means
any tangible personal property which is
distributed in commerce and which is normally
used for personal, family, or household
purposes
(including any such property
intended to be attached to or installed in
any real property without regard to whether
it is so attached or installed.)
(2)
The term "Commission" means the
Federal Trade Commission.
(3) The term "consumer" means a buyer
(other than for purposes of resale) of any
consumer product, any person to whom such
product is transferred during the duration of
an implied or written warranty (or service
contract) applicable to the product, and any
other person who is entitled by the terms of
such warranty (or service contract) or under
applicable State law to enforce against the
warrantor
(or service contractor)
the
obligations of the warranty
(or service
contract).
(4)
The term "supplier" means any
person engaged in the business of making a
consumer product directly or indirectly
available to consumers.
(5)
The term "warrantor" means any
supplier or other person who gives or offers
to give a written warranty or who is or may
be obligated under an implied warranty.
(6)

The term "written warranty" means-

vi

sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a
buyer which relates to the nature of the
material or workmanship and affirms or
promises that such material or workmanship is
defect free or will meet a specified level of
performance over a specified period of time,
or
(B) any undertaking in writing in
connection with the sale by a supplier of a
consumer* product to refund, repair, replace,
or take other remedial action with respect to
such product in the event that such product
fails to meet the specifications set forth in
the undertaking,
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking
becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a
supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale
of such product.
(7)
The term "implied warranty" means an
implied warranty arising under State law (as
modified by sections 2308 and 2304(a) of this
title) in connection with the sale of a supplier of
a consumer product.
(8)
The term "service
contract in writing to perform,
of time or for a specified
relating to the maintenance or
a consumer product.

contract" means a
over a fixed period
duration, services
repair (or both) of

(9)
The term "reasonable and necessary
maintenance" consists of those operations (A) which
the consumer reasonably can be expected to perform
or have performed and (B) which are necessary to
keep any consumer product performing its intended
function and operating at a reasonable level of
performance.
(10) The term "remedy" means whichever of the
following actions the warrantor elects:
(A) repair,
(B)

replacement, or

vii

(C)

refund;

except that the warrantor may not elect refund
unless (i) the warrantor is unable to provide
replacement and repair is not commercially
practicable or cannot be timely made, or (ii) the
consumer is willing to accept such refund.
(11) The term "replacement" means furnishing
a new consumer product which is identical or
reasonably equivalent to the warranted
(12)
The term "refund" means refunding the
actual purchase price (less reasonable depreciation
based on actual use where permitted by rules of the
Commission).
(13) The term "distributed in commerce" means
sold in commerce, introduced or delivered for
introduction into commerce, or held for sale or
distribution after introduction into commerce.
(14)
The term "commerce" means
traffic, commerce, or transportation -

trade,

(A) between a place in a State and any
place outside thereof, or

(B) which affects trade, traffic,
commerce, or transportation described in
subparagraph (A).
(15)
The term "State" means a State, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Canal Zone, or
American Samoa. The term "State of law" includes a
law of the United States applicable only to the
District of Columbia or only to a territory or
possession of the United States; and the term
"Federal law" excludes any State law.

viii

15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3)

§ 2304(a). In order for a warrantor warranting a
consumer product by means of a written warranty to
meet the Federal minimum standards for warranty (3) such warrantor may not exclude or
limit consequential damages for breach of any
written or implied warranty on such product,
unless
such exclusion or limitation
conspicuously appears on the face of the
warranty . . • ;

ix

Rule 4-501

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

X

Rule 4-501

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

(5) The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material
facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists Each disputed fact
shall be stated m separate numbered sentences and shall refer with particularity to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies,
and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed All material facts set forth m the movant's
statement shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

xi

Rule 52

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 52

Rule 52. Findings by the court,
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) A m e n d m e n t Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
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70A-2-316. Exclusion or modification of warranties —
LivestockCD Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of
this chapter on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 70A-2-202) negation or
limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability
and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it
states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the
description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the
goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to
examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects
which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to
him: and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of
dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter on liquidation or limitation of damages and on
contractual modification of remedy (sections 70A-2-718 and 70A-2-719).
(5) If a contract for the sale of livestock, which may include cattle, hogs,
sheep, and horses, does not contain a written statement as to warranty of
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose, there shall be no implied
warranty that the livestock are free from disease and sickness at the time of
the sale and the seller shall not be liable for damages arising from the lack of
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.

SALES
ity" clauses. This Article treats
the limitation or avoidance of
consequential damages as a matter of limiting remedies for
breach, separate from the matter
of creation of liability under a
warranty. If no warranty exists, there is of course no problem of limiting remedies for
breach of warranty. Under subsection (4) the question of limitation of remedy is governed by
the sections referred to rather
than by this section.
3. Disclaimer .of the implied
warranty • of - merchantability. is :t
permitted under subsection '(2);>
but with the safeguard that such »
disclaimers „ must mention mer-/
chantability and in : case of a>
writing must be conspicuous.*
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(a), (b) and (c) of subsection
(3) are common factual situations in which the circumstances
surrounding the transaction are
in themselves sufficient to call
the buyer's attention to the fact
that no implied warranties are
made or that a certain implied
warranty is being excluded.

7. Paragraph (a) of subsection (3) deals with general terms
such as "as is," "as they stand,"
"with all faults," and the like.
Such terms in ordinary commercial usage are understood to
mean that the buyer takes the
entire risk as to the quality of
the goods involved. The terms
covered by paragraph (a) are
in fact merely a particularization of paragraph (c) which pro4. Unlike the implied warranvides for exclusion or modificaty of merchantability, implied
tion of implied warranties by
warranties of fitness for a par-,, usage of trade.
ticular purpose may be excluded f
8. Under paragraph (b) of
by general language, but only if
subsection
(3) warranties may
it Js,in writing and conspicuous.
be excluded or modified by the
5. Subsection (2) presupcircumstances where the buyer
poses that the implied warranty
examines the goods or a sample
in question exists unless excludor model of them before entering
ed or modified. Whether or not
into the contract. "Examinalanguage of disclaimer satisfies
t i o n " - ^ used in this paragraph/
the requirements of this section,
is not synonymous with inspec- ,
such language may be relevant
tion before acceptance or at any
under other sections to the quesother time after the contract has ,
tion whether the warranty was
been made. It goes rather to the
ever in fact created. Thus, unnature of the responsibility asless the provisions of this Arsumed by the seller at the time
ticle on parol and extrinsic eviof the making of the contract.
dence prevent, oral language of
Of course if the buyer discovers
disclaimer may raise issues of
the defect and uses the goods
fact as to whether reliance by
anyway, or if he unreasonably
the buyer occurred and whether
fails to examine the goods before
the seller had "reason to know'*
he uses them, resulting injuries
under the section on implied
may be found to result from his
warranty of fitness for a particuown action rather than proxilar purpose.
mately from a breach of warranty.
See Sections 2—314 and 2—
6. The exceptions to the gen715 and comments thereto.
eral rule set forth in paragraphs
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70A-2-719. Contractual modification or limitation of remedy.
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section
and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a)
the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in
substitution for those provided in this chapter and may limit
or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this
chapter, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the
goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of nonconforming goods or parts; and
(b)
resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy
is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the
sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail
of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable., Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods
is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the
loss is commercial is not

§ 2—719
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Official
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: None.
Purposes:
1. Under this section parties
are left free to shape their remedies to their particular requirements and reasonable agreements limiting or modifying
remedies are to be given effect.
However, it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at
least minimum adequate remedies be available. If the parties
intend to conclude a contract
for sale within this Article they
must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a
fair .quantum of remedy for
breach of the obligations or duties r outlined - in the contract.
Thus any clause purporting to
modify or limit the remedial provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner is subject
to deletion and in that event the
remedies made available by this
Article are applicable as if the
stricken clause had never existed. Similarly, under subsection
(2), where an apparently fair
and reasonable clause because
of circumstances fails in its pur-»
pose or operates to deprive ei-'
ther * party of the substantial
value of the bargain, it must*

give way to the general remedy
provisions of this Article.,
2. Subsection (1) (b) creates
a presumption that clauses prescribing remedies are cumulative rather than exclusive. If
the parties intend the term to
describe the sole remedy under
the contract, this must be clearly
expressed.
3. Subsection (3) recognizes
the validity of clauses limiting
or excluding consequential damages but makes it clear that they
may not operate in an unconscionable manner.
Actually
such terms are merely an allocation of unknown or undeterminable risks. The seller in all
cases is free to disclaim warranties in the manner provided
in Section 2—316.
Cross References:
Point 1: Section 2—302.
Point 3: Section 2—316.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreement". Section 1—201.
"Buyer". Section 2—103.
"Conforming".
Section 2—
106.
"Contract". Section 1—201.
"Goods". Section 2—105.
"Remedy". Section 1—201.
"Seller". Section 2—103.

